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OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
In 1983, NOVA Chemicals, Inc. and Sekisui Plastics,
Co., Ltd. entered into a License Agreement under which NOVA
was permitted to use a new process to produce a Styrofoam-type
product called Piocelan.  Under the agreement, NOVA was
permitted to sell Piocelan products anywhere in the world,
except in certain Asian countries.  Nearly twenty years later,
1 ARCO was a Pennsylvania corporation with its
principal place of business in Pennsylvania.
2 NOVA is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Pennsylvania.
3 By Piocelan process we mean Sekisui’s PO Polymer
Manufacturing Process, PO-EPS Manufacturing Process, PO
3
NOVA began selling Piocelan products in the Asian countries
excluded from the License Agreement.  After Sekisui objected
that NOVA was in violation of the License Agreement, NOVA
filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief.  In granting
summary judgment in favor of NOVA, the District Court
determined that, based on the plain language of the License
Agreement, all of its terms expired in 1995.  Although we find
certain portions of the License Agreement are ambiguous, we
agree with the District Court that there is no reasonable
interpretation of the agreement under which NOVA has any
continuing obligations to Sekisui.  Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.  
A.
In 1978, ARCO Chemical Company (“ARCO” or
“ACC”),1 a predecessor to NOVA,2 entered into an agreement
to license technology from Sekisui, a Japanese company.  That
agreement included an option to license an earlier version of
Sekisui’s Piocelan technology.  However, ARCO determined
that the process was impractical and permitted the option to
expire.  By 1982, Sekisui had developed a better Piocelan
process3 and began to negotiate an agreement for ARCO to
Pre-Expanded-Particle Manufacturing Process, PX Polymer
Manufacturing Process, PX-EPS Manufacturing Process, PX
Pre-Expanded-Particle Manufacturing Process, and Colored
Bead Technology.  For clarity, we will refer to products
manufactured using the Piocelan process as “Piocelan products.”
4
market the improved Piocelan products in the United States.
In October 1982, representatives from ARCO and Sekisui
met in Japan.  Sekisui prepared the first draft of the License
Agreement and sent a translation to ARCO.  The companies
exchanged a number of drafts and proposed modifications.  The
final draft of the License Agreement was prepared by an ARCO
attorney.  The License Agreement was signed in December 1982
and went into effect in January 1983.
At the time the contract was negotiated, Sekisui was
selling “expanded” Piocelan products that were difficult to ship
long distances.  While ARCO was interested in developing
products that could be shipped, it was not interested in selling in
the Asian market, where Sekisui was based.
B.
Like the earlier agreement between the parties, the
License Agreement gave ARCO an option to acquire a ten-year
license to use Sekisui’s Piocelan process.  During the three year
option period, the License Agreement also granted ARCO an
exclusive license to use Sekisui’s secret technical information
and patent rights to produce Piocelan products and develop a
4 ARCO could elect to extend the option period by one
year at no additional cost, or to terminate the option and license
at any time.
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market for them in the United States and Canada.4  In particular,
this initial license gave ARCO access to all technical
information and know-how, including formulations and
equipment designs, useful to produce various Piocelan products.
The license also included: 
any United States or Canadian patents or patent
applications in the United States or Canada now
or hereafter owned or controlled by SEKISUI or
wherein SEKISUI has licensing rights, which are
based on inventions made on or before [January 1,
1983], to the extent that any of the claims thereof
cover [Piocelan products or technology].
(License Agreement ¶ 1.9.)  In exchange for the three-year
option and initial license, ARCO agreed to pay Sekisui $100,000
in two installments—$50,000 at the beginning of the option
period and $50,000 within eighteen months.
Sekisui agreed that it would disclose within the first three
months of the option period, “all technical information and data”
related to the Piocelan process.  Sekisui also agreed to provide
any technical assistance ARCO needed to implement the
Piocelan process.
ARCO agreed to keep information provided under the
License Agreement “secret and confidential from any third party
. . . . for a five (5) year period from the date of termination” if
ARCO elected to terminate the contract without exercising its
5 The earlier payment of $100,000 to acquire to the option
was credited towards this total.
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option and “for a period of ten (10) years from the date of
exercise” if ARCO did exercise its option to acquire a ten-year
license.  (Id. art. IV.) 
 If ARCO exercised the option, Paragraph 5.4 of the
License Agreement provided that Sekisui would “automatically”
grant ARCO a ten-year exclusive license “under all [of Sekisui’s
intellectual property] to produce, sell and use [Piocelan
products] in the [United States and Canada] . . . [and a non-
exclusive license] to sell [Piocelan products] in all countries of
the world except in the following countries: Japan, Korea,
China, Hong Kong, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.”  (Id. ¶ 5.4.)  In
exchange for these rights, ARCO agreed to make a $500,000
lump sum payment,5 and to pay royalties on the total volume of
Piocelan products sold during the ten-year life of the license.
The parties’ dispute in this case is centered around
Article XI of the License Agreement.  Article XI is titled
“TERM AND TERMINATION.”  It provides that 
This Agreement shall . . . remain in full force and
effect for a period of ten (10) years from the date
of exercise by [ARCO] of the option in
Paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3, unless this Agreement is
terminated earlier as provided in Paragraph 5.6 or
ARTICLE IX.  Upon payment of the Lump Sum
Payment and Running Royalties due under
Paragraph 6.1, [ARCO] shall have a fully paid-up
6 The License Agreement provides that “[t]he validity,
interpretation and performance of this Agreement shall be
7
right and license to use and sublicense [the
Piocelan process and Piocelan products] in any of
its United States and/or Canadian plants and to
sell [Piocelan products] produced anywhere in the
world (subject to paragraph 5.4).
C.
In 1985, ARCO exercised its option to acquire a ten-year
license as provided in Paragraph 5.4 of the License Agreement.
In 1996, NOVA acquired ARCO and became a party to the
License Agreement by assignment.
In 2002, NOVA began selling Piocelan products in the
Asian market.  It now sells these products, under the trade name
ARCEL, in China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore,
Vietnam, and Malaysia.  When Sekisui objected, NOVA sought
a declaratory judgment that the License Agreement did not
prohibit these sales.  The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of NOVA, finding that the License
Agreement had no continuing force after 1995, that the
agreement never prohibited NOVA from selling Piocelan
products in Asia, and that Sekisui’s proposed interpretation
raised serious questions about the legality of the contract.
II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Both parties agree that Pennsylvania law
governs interpretation of the License Agreement.6
governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
United States of America.”  (License Agreement ¶ 17.1.)
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We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo.  Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund
v. Rolls-Royce Motorcars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.
1993).  In doing so, we need not limit our analysis to the
grounds stated in the District Court’s decision.  Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970) (“The prevailing party
may, of course, assert in a reviewing court any ground in
support of his judgment, whether or not that ground was relied
upon or even considered by the trial court.”); Cospito v.
Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 78 n.8 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).  
A.
In Pennsylvania, “[t]he paramount goal of contract
interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties.”  Garden
State Tanning, Inc. v. Mitchell Mfg. Group, Inc., 273 F.3d 332,
335 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Meeting House Lane, Ltd. v. Melso,
628 A.2d 854, 857 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).  The strongest
manifestation of that intent is the wording of the agreement
itself.  Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d
1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law).  “[T]he
language used in a contract is normally to be given its ordinary
meaning in the absence of evidence of some special meaning.”
Light v. Miller, 450 A.2d 51, 53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (citing 8
Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia § 145).
“[W]here language is clear and unambiguous, the focus
of interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as
9manifestly expressed, rather than as, perhaps, silently intended.”
Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (emphasis
omitted).  On the other hand, where the language of a contract
negotiated between equal parties is ambiguous, “extrinsic or
parol evidence [may] be considered to determine the intent of
the parties.”  Ferrer v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 825 A.2d
591, 608 (Pa. 2002) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth the
following definition of “ambiguity”:
Contractual language is ambiguous if it is
reasonably susceptible of different constructions
and capable of being understood in more than one
sense.  This is not a question to be resolved in a
vacuum.  Rather, contractual terms are ambiguous
if they are subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation when applied to a particular set of
facts.  We will not, however, distort the meaning
of the language or resort to a strained contrivance
in order to find an ambiguity.
Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d
100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
B.
Somewhat paradoxically, Sekisui, the licensor, argues
that it granted NOVA a permanent license to sell and use its
technology.  NOVA, the licensee, argues that the license had a
defined term of ten years and expired thereafter.
Sekisui maintains that the License Agreement provided
10
NOVA an opportunity to obtain two separate licenses to use its
Piocelan process.  The first is the ten-year license set forth in
Paragraph 5.4.  The second is the “fully paid-up” license
described in Article XI.  According to Sekisui, the “fully paid-
up” license only came into being “upon payment of the . . .
Running Royalties due under Paragraph 6.1.”  Thus, the “fully
paid-up” license must refer to a license granted only after ten
years of royalty payments.
Because the contract does not specify a termination date
for the “fully paid-up” license described in Article XI, Sekisui
contends that it lasts indefinitely.  Sekisui also maintains that by
incorporating Paragraph 5.4, the “fully paid-up” license
prohibits NOVA from selling Piocelan products in the listed
Asian countries.  Thus, Sekisui insists that NOVA is indefinitely
barred from selling Piocelan products in the listed countries.
Conversely, NOVA argues that the License Agreement
grants one license lasting only ten years.  Although the “fully
paid-up” license exists “upon payment of the . . . Running
Royalties,” NOVA maintains that this simply means the ten-year
license was contingent on payment of any royalties that had
accrued to date.  Thus, the License Agreement has no terms that
extend beyond the ten-year license period.
Further, NOVA asserts that while the License Agreement
did not affirmatively grant NOVA rights to sell in Asian
countries, it also does not bar NOVA from selling in those
countries.  According to NOVA, a license is a grant of rights
that the licensee would not otherwise have, and therefore the
exclusion of Asian countries from the scope of the license is not
an affirmative bar on selling in these countries.  Thus, if NOVA
would otherwise have a legal right to sell Piocelan products in
11
Asia absent the License Agreement, then the license cannot
deprive it of that right.  Accordingly, the agreement does not
impede NOVA from selling Piocelan products in Asia.
C.
1.
First, we turn to whether the Article XI “fully paid-up”
license refers to the ten-year Paragraph 5.4 license, or a separate
license.  We find that there are two reasonable interpretations of
Article XI.  First, as Sekisui contends, Article XI could mean
that the parties intended to grant NOVA a continuing license to
manufacture and sell Piocelan products at the end of the ten-year
period of running royalties, in other words when the payments
required by Article VI were “fully paid-up.”  On the other hand,
as NOVA contends and the District Court found, the second
sentence of Article XI could be intended simply to signify what
was necessary to maintain the Paragraph 5.4 license during its
ten-year term.
There is considerable linguistic and structural support for
each interpretation.  As to the first interpretation, the language
of the second sentence of Article XI is not identical to the
language of Paragraph 5.4.  Paragraph 5.4 provides that: 
Following the payment by [ARCO] to Sekisui of
[the $500,000 lump sum payment] under
Paragraph 6.1(a)(3), an exclusive license with the
right to sublicense is automatically granted to
[ARCO] during the term of this Agreement under
all SEKISUI PO TECHNOLOGY, SEKISUI PX
TECHNOLOGY, SEKISUI COLORED BEAD
TECHNOLOGY, PATENT RIGHTS,
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COLORED BEAD PATENT RIGHTS to
produce, sell and use all PRODUCTS and other
resinous materials in the LICENSED
TERRITORY.  Moreover, [ARCO] and its
sublicensee shall have the right to sell
PRODUCTS and other resinous materials in all
countries of the world except in the following
countries: Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong,
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, India and Pakistan.
In contrast, the second sentence of Article XI, provides
that NOVA shall have a license “upon payment of the
[$500,000] Lump Sum Payment and Running Royalties due
under Paragraph 6.1.”  Thus, the Paragraph 5.4 license begins
with a lump sum payment.  The Article XI license on the other
hand requires the payment of both the lump sum payment and
running royalties.  Further, the Paragraph 5.4 license is
exclusive in the United States and Canada, and non-exclusive
elsewhere.  The Article XI license is not exclusive.
In addition, Sekisui’s argument that Article XI creates
rights and obligations beyond the ten-year license is consistent
with the License Agreement’s overall structure; the License
Agreement conveys a shifting array of licensing arrangements
rather than a single discrete license.  First, the License
Agreement provides a three-year exclusive domestic license
during the option period.  Then, it provides the Paragraph 5.4
exclusive domestic license, and non-exclusive foreign license.
In addition, the License Agreement conveys “an exclusive
license to use the trademark ‘Piocelan’ in the [United States and
Canada] for the sale of [Piocelan-related products].”  (License
Agreement ¶ 15.1.)  Since the License Agreement has at least
three separate licensing provisions, it becomes more reasonable
to read Article XI as doing more than reiterating an earlier
license. 
On the other hand, the first sentence of Article XI
7 NOVA argues that its reading is the only reasonable
interpretation of “fully paid-up license” because the alternative
is a contract with a perpetual duration, a result it maintains is
disfavored by Pennsylvania law.  See Hutchison v. Sunbeam
Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 n.5 (Pa. 1986) (discussing
presumption against perpetual contracts in context of coal
mining lease).  This rule has been followed in a number of
subsequent cases concerning coal mining rights.  See, e.g., Leet
v. Vinglas, 531 A.2d 17, 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).  However, the
meaning of Article XI and the duration of any license conveyed
by this provision are separate issues, and we need not decide the
‘perpetual duration’ question posed by NOVA.
8 Because we find that it is possible to resolve the dispute
between the parties without resolving the ambiguity in Article
XI, we need not consider the extrinsic evidence of the parties’
intent.  However, we do note that the extrinsic evidence is
equivocal and lends some support to each proposed
interpretation.  
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provides that “this Agreement” shall have a ten-year term from
the date ARCO exercised its option.7  The second sentence of
Article XI could be read to clarify what was meant by “this
Agreement” and to explain that, to maintain its ten-year license,
ARCO was required to stay up-to-date on any accrued royalty
payments—that is to stay “fully paid-up.”  
Because there are two linguistically possible, reasonable
interpretations of Article XI, it is ambiguous.  However, as set
forth below, we find that it is not necessary to resolve this
ambiguity.8 
2.
We need not resolve any ambiguity in Article XI,
because—even if the “fully paid-up” license is indeed a separate
license enduring past the ten year term of the License
14
Agreement—we conclude that the “fully paid-up” license
clearly expired along with Sekisui’s intellectual property rights
in the Piocelan process.  Because Sekisui does not have
continuing intellectual property rights in Piocelan, the License
Agreement has no continuing force.
The License Agreement does not explicitly fix a definite
duration for the “fully paid-up” license.  Relying on
Rossmassler v. Spielberger, 112 A. 876 (Pa. 1921), Sekisui
argues that the “fully paid-up” license must therefore be
permanent.  However, Pennsylvania courts hold that “where
there is no express provision in the contract as to its duration or
termination the intention of the parties in that regard is . . .
determined from the surrounding circumstances and by an
application of a reasonable construction to the agreement as a
whole.”  Inst. for Sci. Info., Inc. v. Gordon and Breach, Sci.
Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1009 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (applying
Pennsylvania law); see also Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 133 A.2d
829, 834 (Pa. 1957) (“When a contract is silent on its duration,
parol evidence is always admissible to show the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract, the situation of the
parties, the objects they apparently had in view, and the nature
of the subject matter of the agreement, to show whether the
agreement was to endure for a reasonable time or for some
particular period.”); Price v. Confair, 79 A.2d 224, 226 (Pa.
1951) (“[C]ontracts which do not fix a definite time for the
duration of the relationship which they create are sometimes
construed as providing for a reasonable time or some particular
period inferred from the nature and circumstances of the
undertaking.”).  For example, in Thomas v. Thomas Flexible
Coupling Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied this rule
to determine that a patent license agreement terminated with the
expiration “of the life of the patents which constituted their
subject matter.”  46 A.2d 212, 215 (Pa. 1946).
Indeed, even Rossmassler stands for the proposition that,
9 The License Agreement also permitted NOVA to use
Sekisui’s Piocelan trademark.  Sekisui does not argue that this
was the basis of the “fully paid-up” license, and in any event,
NOVA markets the products under its own trademark.  
10 Although neither party presented evidence of particular
patents, any patent in effect in 1983 would have expired by
2002.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154.  If Sekisui believes that it has
continuing intellectual property to which the License Agreement
applies, it should have presented evidence to that effect before
the District Court.  We note that Sekisui has not claimed that
NOVA’s Asian sales infringe any of its patent rights.  Further,
at oral argument Sekisui repeatedly emphasized that the basis
for its argument is the trade secrets it conveyed pursuant to the
License Agreement, rather than any patent rights. 
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absent an explicit term, the duration of a contract is to be
determined based on its subject matter.  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted in Rossmassler that “the intention of the
parties to an agreement that it should be perpetual and without
limit as to duration could not be more properly expressed than
by silence as to any time limit or power of revocation.”  112 A.
at  880.  However, the ultimate holding of that case was that “the
courts will always deduce the term from the nature of the
subject-matter if it is at all possible so to do.”  Id.
In evaluating the duration of the claimed “fully paid-up”
license, we start with the subject matter of the License
Agreement.  The subject matter of the contract is Sekisui’s
“patent rights and valuable technical information of a
confidential nature relating to the expandable [Piocelan] resins.”
(License Agreement, preface; App. at 52.)  Thus, we must
consider the duration of the patent rights and trade secrets
involved in the License Agreement.9  
Patents have a defined duration, see 35 U.S.C. § 154, and
the District Court found that Sekisui’s patents have expired.10
11 Although the economic reasoning in Brulotte has been
criticized, it remains good law and binding precedent.  See, e.g.,
Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (7th Cir.
2002).
12  Trade secrets are now defined by 12 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5302 as:
Information . . . that: (1) Derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use.  (2) Is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to
16
If the License Agreement were only based on patent rights, it is
implicit that it would have terminated with the expiration of
those patent rights.  See Thomas, 46 A.2d at 215; cf. Brulotte v.
Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1964) (holding that contract to
extract royalty payments after patent has expired is
unenforceable based on federal patent law).11
However, determining the duration of the License
Agreement is complicated by the trade secret rights Sekisui
claims were at the heart of the agreement.  Unlike a patent
monopoly, trade secret protections are theoretically unlimited in
duration, lasting as long as the information remains a trade
secret.  Factors relevant to determining whether information is
a trade secret include the extent to which it is known outside the
owner’s business; the extent to which it is known by employees
and others within the owner’s business; the extent of measures
taken to guard the secrecy of the information; the value of the
information to competitors; the effort or money expended to
develop the information; and the ease or difficulty with which
it could be properly acquired or duplicated.12  SI Handling Sys.,
maintain its secrecy.  
Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 2004.
It is applicable to misappropriations occurring after this date, but
not to continuing misappropriation that began earlier.  2004 Pa.
Legis. Serv. Act 2004-14, § 4.  The standard set forth above in
text derives from Comment b to Section 757 of the Restatement
of Torts.  Pennsylvania courts continue to look to this standard
to determine whether information constitutes a trade secret
under the statute.  See, e.g., Lukes v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
—A.2d—, 2009 WL 1532273, at *13 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2009).
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Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985).  Four of
these six factors are directed at gauging the secrecy of the
information because “[t]he most important characteristic of a
trade secret is that it is in fact secret.”  James Pooley, Trade
Secrets § 4.04 (2009).  
Under the License Agreement, Sekisui shared its
confidential technical information with NOVA.  However, not
all disclosures will destroy a trade secret.  For example, a trade
secret owner may license its secret information without losing
legal protections.  See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 486 (1974) (noting that trade secret protections permit
a trade secret holder to share his discoveries with a manufacturer
in exchange for a binding legal obligation to pay a license fee
and to protect the secret); see also Pooley, Trade Secrets § 8.06.
Trade secret licenses are generally “rental” agreements, under
which the trade secret holder retains ownership.  Pooley, Trade
Secrets § 8.06.  Nonetheless, under the terms of the License
Agreement, after 1995, NOVA was not required to maintain the
secrecy of any information it had acquired from Sekisui.  (See
License Agreement art. IV.)  Thus, the information lost its trade
secret status, at least between Sekisui and NOVA, in 1995.  See
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“If
an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under
18
no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information 
. . . his property right is extinguished.” (citing 1 R. Milgrim,
Trade Secrets § 1.01[2] (1983))).
 The fact that Sekisui did not seek to protect its purported
trade secrets after 1995 seems inconsistent with the notion that
trade secrets, rather than patent rights, were at the heart of the
License Agreement.  If Sekisui’s “know-how” was so essential
to producing products based on its Piocelan technology, it is
hard to understand why either party would want to risk that
information becoming public.  Nonetheless, for the purposes of
this appeal, we will assume that, as the License Agreement itself
asserts, conveying access to trade secrets was a central purpose
of the agreement.
The expiration of NOVA’s obligation to maintain the
secrecy of Sekisui’s technical information does not necessarily
resolve the duration of the “fully paid-up” license.  Trade secret
licenses may endure even where the trade secret itself is
destroyed by general disclosure.  See Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979);  Warner-Lambert Pharm.
Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655, 665-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam)
(adopting District Court opinion).
In Aronson, an inventor agreed to disclose her design for
a new type of keyholder in exchange for royalty payments;
higher payments if she was able to obtain a patent and lower
payments otherwise.  440 U.S. at 259.  Both parties understood
that the design would “cease[] to have any secrecy as soon as it
was first marketed,” and that it was unclear whether the
keyholder was patentable.  Id. at 266.  The Supreme Court held
that state law, rather than patent law, determined whether the
agreement was enforceable, effectively affirming that district
court’s decision that the manufacturer had a continuing
obligation to pay royalty payments despite the inventor’s failure
to obtain a patent and the loss of the design’s trade secret status
at the beginning of the agreement.  Id. at 262-66.
19
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. concerned the
license to manufacture Listerine. 178 F. Supp. at 657.  For over
75 years, Warner-Lambert and its predecessors made royalty
payments for the once secret formula for Listerine.  Id.  The
original license called for royalty payments to be paid “for each
and every gross of said Listerine hereafter sold.”  Id. at 658.
However, Warner-Lambert tired of making the royalty payments
when the “secret formula” became common knowledge,
published in a number of public sources.  Id. at 659-60.  
The Warner-Lambert court acknowledged that
intellectual property license agreements generally expire with
the life of the intellectual property.  Id. at 664.  Nonetheless, the
court found that Warner-Lambert was obligated to continue
making the payments as long as it made a product based on the
original formula.  Id. at 665 (holding that “one who acquires a
secret formula or a trade secret through a valid and binding
contract . . . [may not] escape from an obligation to which he
bound himself simply because the secret is discovered by a third
party or by the general public.”).  In doing so, the court
distinguished the public policy concerns implicated by trade
secrets and other types of intellectual property.  The court
focused on the fact that in “patent and copyright cases the
parties are dealing with a fixed statutory term and the monopoly
granted by that term,” while in trade secret cases the life span of
the trade secret cannot generally be known.  Id.  Thus, “[o]ne
who acquires a trade secret or secret formula takes it subject to
the risk that there be a disclosure.”  Id. at 666.
As a result, on its own, the subject matter of the License
Agreement does not determine the duration of the “fully paid-
up” license.  Accordingly, we turn to other aspects of the
License Agreement.  Unlike the agreements in Warner-Lambert
and Aronson, the terms of the License Agreement in this case do
not suggest that it has any ongoing vitality after the termination
of Sekisui’s intellectual property rights.
In both Aronson and Warner-Lambert, the courts focused
13 Because the Asia exception is a limitation on a license
to use certain intellectual property, it only prohibits NOVA from
using that intellectual property to sell Piocelan products in Asia.
It does not prohibit NOVA from selling Piocelan products in
Asia if NOVA’s authority for doing so is independent of the
License Agreement and those intellectual property rights.  Once
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on aspects of the agreements that evinced an intent to create
ongoing obligations after the life of the relevant intellectual
property.  In Aronson, the parties understood that the relevant
trade secrets would be destroyed as soon as the product was
manufactured.  440 U.S. at 259.  Nevertheless, the parties
explicitly agreed to ongoing royalty payments even if a pending
patent application failed.  Id.  Further, the parties clearly
delineated the consideration applicable to the patent-license
portion of the agreement and the trade-secret license portion of
the agreement.  Id.  In Warner-Lambert, Warner-Lambert agreed
to ongoing royalty payments as long as it continued to
manufacture Listerine, instead of setting a fixed end date or
otherwise limiting its obligation to continue paying.  178 F.
Supp. at 660.  In both cases, the Court found that the licensor
agreed to disclose secret information to a manufacturer in
exchange for ongoing consideration. 
Here, in contrast, nothing in the License Agreement
suggests that the parties intended any ongoing obligations with
respect to trade secrets after the 1995 termination of NOVA’s
obligation to maintain the secrecy of Sekisui’s technical
information.  While Sekisui argues that it only agreed to disclose
its trade secrets and to train NOVA personnel in exchange for
NOVA’s ongoing promise to stay out of Asia (in addition to
lump sum and royalty payments), the terms of the License
Agreement belie this argument.  The Asia exception appears as
a limitation on the scope of NOVA’s rights under Sekisui’s
intellectual property, rather than as an independent restriction or
as consideration for trade secret disclosures.13  
Sekisui’s patents expired and the secrecy obligations terminated,
NOVA had such an independent right to sell Piocelan
products—the same right held by the general public.
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Further, Sekisui disclosed its trade secrets during the
option period.  If NOVA had chosen not to exercise its option to
acquire a ten-year license to manufacture Piocelan products,
Sekisui’s trade secrets would have been protected for only five
years after NOVA rejected the license.  In this circumstance, the
Asia exception never would have come into force at all; NOVA
would have been undisputably free to make use of Sekisui’s
trade secrets after five years and to market Piocelan products
anywhere in the world as soon as Sekisui’s patents expired.
Thus, if it was intended as consideration at all, the Asia
exception could only have been consideration for a license under
Sekisui’s patent rights and to use Sekisui’s trade secrets during
the period they remained protected, rather than for the initial
disclosure of those trade secrets.
 Finally, none of the extrinsic evidence supplied by the
parties suggests that they intended the Asia exception to be a
stand-alone provision, or any terms of the License Agreement to
survive the expiration of Sekisui’s patent rights and NOVA’s
secrecy obligations with respect to the trade secrets.
Considering the subject matter and language of the
License Agreement, and its surrounding circumstances we find
that the parties could not have intended the “fully paid-up”
license to survive the expiration of Sekisui’s intellectual
property.
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III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
